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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of the living arrangements (coresidence behavior) of elderly
parents and their children (whether elderly parents live with their children, and if so, with which child)
in Japan using micro data from a household survey.  Our results provide support for all four explanations
of coresidence behavior but especially for the life cycle and dynasty models (both of which assume
selfishly motivated parents) and social norms and traditions: The fact that parents who were self-employed
before retirement are more likely to live with their children, the fact that parents are less likely to live
with sons who adopt their wife’s surname, and the fact that parents are more likely to live with daughters
whose husbands adopt their surname constitute evidence in favor of the dynasty model.  The fact that
parents who were (relatively wealthy) executives before retirement and parents who are homeowners
are more likely to live with their children and the fact that parents are more likely to live with less
educated children constitute evidence in favor of the selfish life cycle model (or the altruism model).
And the fact that parental attitudes toward their children affect their coresidence behavior, the fact
that parents are more likely to live with their eldest child if their eldest child is a son, and the fact that
parents are most likely to live with their eldest son even if he is not the eldest child constitute evidence
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Children, especially eldest sons, are much more likely to live with their elderly parents in 
Japan than in the West.  Why is that?  What motivates elderly parents and their children to 
live with each other in Japan?    Which child tends to live with the parents in Japan and why?   
Is it possible to explain the living arrangements (coresidence behavior) of elderly parents and 
their children in Japan using existing theoretical models of household behavior or do we have 
to resort to social norms and traditions?    The social norm in Japan has been for the eldest son 
to live with his elderly parents, to take care of them, to carry on the family line, and to receive 
the parents’ entire bequest including the family home, and it is possible that the eldest son 
lives with his elderly parents not because it is economically rational for him to do so but 
simply because he is adhering to the aforementioned social norm.     
In this paper, we analyze the determinants of the living arrangements (coresidence 
behavior) of elderly parents and their children (whether elderly parents live with their children, 
and if so, with which child) in Japan using micro data from the 1998 “National Family Survey 
(in Japanese, Kazoku ni tsuiteno Zenkoku Chousa),” which was conducted in January 1999 
and provided by National Family Research of Japan and the Information Center for Social 
Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo (SSJ Data 
Archive).    In so doing, we try to shed light on which theoretical model of household behavior 
(the dynasty model, the selfish life cycle model, or the altruism model) applies in Japan and 
the extent to which Japanese households adhere to social norms and traditions. 
There have been a number of studies of the determinants of the living arrangements of 
elderly parents and their children in Japan.  One such study is Horioka, et al. (2000), which 
analyzes data from the 1996 “U.S.-Japan Comparison Survey of Saving (Chochiku ni kansuru 
Nichibei Hikaku Chousa),” conducted by the Institute of Posts and Telecommunications Policy 
of the former Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications of the Government of Japan, and 
finds that elderly parents are more likely to live with their children if they are planning to 
leave a bequest to their children, whereas such a relationship is not observed in the United 
States.    Similarly, Ohtake (1991) and Ohtake and Horioka (1994) analyze data from the 1986 
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 “National Livelihood Survey (Kokumin Seikatsu Kiso Chousa),” conducted by the Ministry of 
Health, Labor and Welfare of the Government of Japan, and find that the likelihood of 
coresidence increases as the bequeathable wealth (housing assets) of elderly parents 
increases.
1    Iwamoto and Fukui (2001) analyze data from the 1986 and 1995 administrations 
of the same survey used by Ohtake (1991) and Ohtake and Horioka (1994) and find that 
elderly parents living in the ten largest cities (the value of whose land holdings is much higher 
than those living in other areas) are more likely to live with their children than those living 
elsewhere.    All of these results suggest that the Japanese are selfishly motivated, with elderly 
parents using bequests to induce their children to live with them, and children living with their 
elderly parents in order to receive a bequest from their parents. 
Yamada (2006) analyzes data from the “Survey on Life Planning in the Age of Long 
Life (Chouju Jidai no Seikatsu Sekkei),” conducted by the Japan Institute of Life Insurance in 
1992, and finds that children are more likely to live with their parents if they expect to inherit 
their parents’ home, if both the husband and wife work, and if they have pre-nursery school 
age children.  These results suggest that children are selfishly motivated in Japan and that 
they live with their parents in order to inherit their parents’ home and/or in order to elicit child 
care services from their parents.  In a related vein, Kureishi and Wakabayashi (2007) analyze 
data from the 2003 “National Family Survey (in Japanese, Kazoku ni tsuiteno Zenkoku 
Chousa),” the same data source used in this paper, and find that children’s desire to live with 
their parents is motivated by a desire to receive child care services from their parents.    All of 
the foregoing results imply that both parents and children are selfish in Japan and that their 
coresidence behavior is selfishly motivated.     
By contrast, Ando, et al. (1986) find that children who are self-employed are more 
likely to live with their elderly parents, and Iwamoto and Fukui (2001) find that elderly 
parents who are farmers are more likely to live with their children.  To the extent that 
Japanese children who live with their elderly parents are more likely to inherit and carry on the 
family business or the family farm, these findings suggest that the dynasty model applies to at 
least some extent in Japan. 
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 Finally, Martin and Tsuya (1991) and Tsuya and Martin (1992) find that the 
coresidence behavior of parents and children in Japan is determined in part by social norms, 
with sons living in small towns or rural areas and sons in arranged marriages (both of whom 
are more likely to hold traditional views), eldest sons, and daughters married to men other than 
eldest sons being more likely to live with their parents.  However, Martin and Tsuya (1991) 
also find that social norms have weakened over time, with the elderly relying less on sons and 
daughters-in-law and more on spouses and daughters for assistance. 
Thus, previous studies of the living arrangements (coresidence behavior) of elderly 
parents and their children in Japan suggest that the selfish life cycle model, the dynasty model, 
and social norms all hold in Japan to some extent and can partly explain the coresidence 
behavior of parents and children in Japan, but they suffer from a number of drawbacks such as 
their failure to take account of siblings (multiple children).
2 
The contributions of this paper are as follows: first, our paper is the first to analyze the 
living arrangements (coresidence behavior) of elderly parents and their children focusing on 
the number of children and the composition of children’s siblings in Japan.    We believe that it 
is important to take account of information on the number of children and on the composition 
of children’s siblings when analyzing the living arrangements of parents and their children 
because many hypotheses regarding living arrangements predict that these factors will be 
important (for example, the dynasty model of Chu (1991) and the strategic bequest motive of 
Bernheim, et al. (1985)).  Many previous studies, especially Japanese studies, had no choice 
but to ignore children who are not living with their parents because of data limitations.  In this 
paper, by contrast, the survey we use contains various information not only on the elderly 
parents but also on every child, including the distance between the residence of the parents and 
that of every child, which will enable us to analyze the living arrangements of elderly parents 
and their children rigorously.   
The second contribution of this paper is to analyze the impact of social norms and 
traditions on the living arrangements (coresidence behavior) of elderly parents and their 
children.  The survey we use asks respondents about their attitudes towards their children, 
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 and since these questions capture whether or not respondents adhere to Japanese social norms 
and traditions, we can use them to analyze the impact of social norms and traditions on the 
living arrangements of parents and their children. 
To preview our main findings, our results provide support for all four explanations of 
coresidence behavior but especially for the life cycle and dynasty models (both of which 
assume selfishly motivated parents) and social norms and traditions: The fact that parents who 
were self-employed before retirement are more likely to live with their children, the fact that 
parents are less likely to live with sons who adopt their wife’s surname, and the fact that 
parents are more likely to live with daughters whose husbands adopt their surname constitute 
evidence in favor of the dynasty model.  The fact that parents who were (relatively wealthy) 
executives before retirement and parents who are homeowners are more likely to live with 
their children and the fact that parents are more likely to live with less educated children 
constitute evidence in favor of the selfish life cycle model (or the altruism model).  And the 
fact that parental attitudes toward their children affect their coresidence behavior, the fact that 
parents are more likely to live with their eldest child if their eldest child is a son, and the fact 
that parents are most likely to live with their eldest son even if he is not the eldest child 
constitute evidence in favor of social norms and traditions.   
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we discuss four theoretical models of 
household behavior and their implications for parent-child coresidence; in section 3, we 
describe the data source and sample selection; in section 4, we describe the estimation model 
and estimation method; in section 5, we present some descriptive statistics; in section 6, we 
present our estimation results; and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations 
In this section, we briefly introduce four theoretical models of household behavior and discuss 
their implications for parent-child coresidence. 
 
(I)  The Dynasty Model.     
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 The dynasty or lineal model of Chu (1991) assumes that parents care about the perpetuation of 
the family line and/or the family business and hence that they will behave so as to minimize 
the probability of lineal or dynastic extinction.  Thus, this model implies that parents will 
leave a bequest to their children only if their children carry on the family line and/or the 
family business.    It is common for the child who carries on the family line and/or the family 
business to live with his or her parents, as discussed in more detail in section 4 below, so this 
model implies that the child who carries on the family line and/or the family business will live 
with the parents. 
 
(II)  The Selfish Life Cycle Model.     
The selfish life cycle model of Modigliani and Brumberg (1955) assumes that parents as well 
as children are selfish and implies that parents will not leave a bequest to their children unless 
their children live with them and take care of them during old age (i.e., that they will induce 
their children to live with them and take care of them during old age by promising them a 
bequest if they do so).  By the same token, children will not live with their parents and take 
care of them during old age unless they expect to receive a bequest from their parents  (i.e., 
they will induce their parents to leave a bequest to them by living with them and taking care of 
them during old age).  In short, bequests will be a quid pro quo for coresidence and care 
during old age and conversely.  See Bernheim, Summers, and Shleifer (1985) for a rigorous 
theoretical analysis of this so-called “strategic bequest motive.” 
 
(III)  The Altruism Model.     
The altruism model of Barro (1974) and Becker (1974, 1981, 1991) assumes that parents are 
altruistic (harbor intergenerational altruism) towards their children and that they derive utility 
not only from their own consumption but also from the consumption of their children.  This 
model implies that parents will leave a bequest to their children whether or not their children 
live with them and take care of them during old age.    By the same token, if children are also 
altruistic, they will live with their parents and take care of them during old age whether or not 
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 they expect to receive a bequest from them.  Thus, if individuals behave according to the 
altruism model, there should be no relationship between coresidence and bequest motives 
(unless both parents and children are altruistic). 
  
(IV)  Social Norms and Tradition.     
In Japan, it is customary for children (especially the eldest son) to live with their parents and to 
take care of them during old age even if their parents do not leave a bequest to them.  This 
custom arises not from economic considerations but from social norms and traditions—in 
particular, from the Confucian teaching that, when children grow up, they should respect and 
take care of their parents even if their parents do not leave a bequest to them.  The observed 
behavior—that children live with their parents and take care of them during old age even if their 
parents do not leave a bequest to them--is identical to the case in which children are altruistic 
toward their parents (see model III above), but the mechanism is totally different. See Sakudo 
(2007) for a theoretical (Nash bargaining) model of parent-child coresidence that incorporates 
such a social norm or tradition). 
 
Thus, the four theoretical models of household behavior have different implications for 
the determinants of parent-child coresidence.  Thus, we can shed light on which theoretical 
model of household behavior applies in the case of Japan by examining the determinants of 
parent-child coresideence. 
 
3. The Data Source and Sample Selection 
3.1. The Data Source 
The data source we use is micro data from the 1998 “National Family Survey (in Japanese, 
Kazoku ni tsuiteno Zenkoku Chousa)” which was conducted in January 1999 and provided by 
National Family Research of Japan and the Information Center for Social Science Research on 
Japan, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo (SSJ Data Archive). 
This survey collects a variety of detailed information on respondents and their family 
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 members--for example, on the structure of respondents’ families, the socioeconomic 
characteristics of both parents and children, respondents’ attitudes towards their children, etc. 
This survey surveyed a stratified multistage random sample of 10,500 respondents 
between the ages of 28 and 77 (born between January 1, 1921 and December 31, 1970) from 
throughout Japan by the drop-off, pick-up method, resulting in 6,985 responses (a response 
rate of 66.5%). 
   
3.2. Sample Selection 
In this subsection, we discuss the sample we used in our analysis.  Of the 6,985 respondents 
(hereafter called parents (fathers and mothers) or households), 1,070 have no living children, 
952 have one living child, 3,067 have two living children, 1,515 have three living children, 
372 have four or more living children, and 9 did not indicate how many living children they 
have.  First, we used only the subsample of respondents who have one, two, or three living 
children.  Respondents who have four or more living children provide information only on 
the three oldest children, so we were forced to drop these respondents.
3  Second, we used 
only the subsample of respondents for whom the father is 60 or older (if there is no father, 
respondents for whom the mother is 60 or older) because we were interested in the living 
arrangements of elderly parents and their children.  Third, we dropped all observations for 
which all of the necessary information is not available.    Restricting the sample to respondents 
who have one, two and three living children reduced the number of observations from 6,985 to 
5,367, restricting the sample to respondents for whom the father (if there is no father, the 
mother) is 60 or older reduced the number of observations further to 2,068, and restricting the 
sample to respondents for whom all of the necessary information is available reduced the 
number of observations further to 1,652.     
In addition, we divide the sample into (i) respondents with multiple children (called 
sample (i), with 1,373 observations), (ii) respondents with multiple children including at least 
one son (called sample (ii), with 1,125 observations), (iii) respondents with multiple children 
including at least one daughter (called sample (iii), with 1,060 observations), and (iv) 
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 respondents with only one child (called sample (iv), with 279 observations).   
 
4. The Estimation Model and Estimation Method 
We use the following multinomial logit model to test what variables affect the living 
arrangements (coresidence behavior) of parents and their children:   
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  In the case of samples (i), (ii), and (iii), the dependent variable y measures four 
alternative living arrangements of elderly parents: in the case of sample (i), parents who live 
with the eldest child (=1); parents who live with a child or children other than the eldest child 
(=2); parents who live with both the eldest child and other children (=3), and parents who live 
independently (=4); in the case of sample (ii), parents who live with the eldest son (=1); parents 
who live with a child (or children) other than the eldest son (=2); parents who live with both the 
eldest son and other children (=3), and parents who live independently (=4); and in the case of 
sample (iii), parents who live with the eldest daughter (=1); parents who live with a child (or 
children) other than the eldest daughter (=2); parents who live with both the eldest daughter and 
other children (=3), and parents who live independently (=4).  In the case of samples (i), (ii), 
and (iii), we estimate equation (1) using a multinomial logit model because the dependent 
variable y has four unordered response outcomes.
4   In the case of sample (iv), parents choose 
between living with their only child (=1) and living independently (=0), and thus we use a logit 
model to test what variables affect the living arrangements of parents and their only child.  
When constructing the dependent variables, we classify the categories “the child lives in the 
same house as his/her parents” and “the child lives in a separate house on the same property as 
his/her parents” as “the parents live with the child,” and we classify “the child lives within 
walking distance of the parents,” “the child lives within one hour of the parents,” “the child 
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 lives within three hours of the parents,” and “the child lives more than three hours from the 
parents” as “the parents live independently.” 
The explanatory variables include a vector of variables pertaining to the preferences and 
economic backgrounds of parents and (in the case of sample (i)) the eldest child and other 
children, (in the case of sample (ii)) the eldest son and other children, (in the case of sample 
(iii)) the eldest daughter and other children, and (in the case of sample (iv)) the only child. 
Our main interest is to shed light on which theoretical model(s) of household behavior 
apply in Japan by analyzing the determinants of the living arrangements (coresidence behavior) 
of elderly parents and their children in the case of parents with multiple children and those with 
only one child.    In what follows, we discuss the explanatory variables used in our analysis and 
their theoretical impact on the living arrangements of parents and their children. 
 
(I)  The Dynasty Model 
The two variables we use to examine whether individuals behave according to the dynasty 
model are hselfempl (a dummy variable that equals one if the father (the mother if there is no 
father) was a non-professional self-employed worker before retirement) and. hprofl (a dummy 
variable that equals one if the father (the mother if there is no father) was a professional 
self-employed worker such as a doctor, lawyer, etc., before retirement) (the base category is 
fathers (mothers if there is no father) who were salaried workers before retirement).  
Self-employed households are different from salaried worker households because the former 
have a family business that they would presumably like to pass on to their children, preferably 
their eldest son.  If the dynasty model applies, the children of self-employed parents will take 
over the family business in exchange for receiving a bequest (especially the family business), 
and since family businesses are often located in, or adjacent to, the parents’ home, the child who 
takes over the family business is more likely to live with his/her parents.  Thus, if individuals 
behave according to the dynasty model, we would expect hselfempl and hprofl to increase the 
probability of the parents living with their children, especially their eldest son.  Note that these 
results could also be consistent with the selfish life cycle model if the child who lives with the 
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 parents is doing so in return for bequeathing the family business, which presumably generates a 
considerable cash flow, but in our sample, we find that the incomes of the children of 
self-employed parents are lower than the incomes of the children of parents in other occupations, 
which suggests that the explanation based on the selfish life cycle model does not apply. 
Another variant of the dynasty model is that parents care about perpetuating the family 
name or the family line and hence will leave the largest share of their bequest (especially the 
family home) to the child who carries on the family name or the family line.    And it is natural 
for the child who carries on the family name or the family line to live with the parents since he 
or she will eventually inherit the family home.  If this variant of the dynasty model is valid, 
parents should be more likely to live with sons who keep their original surnames and daughters 
who marry a man who adopts their surname and less likely to live with sons who adopt their 
wife’s surname and daughters who adopt their husband’s surname.  Thus, we test this variant 
of the dynasty model by including the following variables: essurname (a dummy variable that 
equals one if there is an eldest son and the eldest son adopts his wife’s surname)), ossurname (a 
dummy variable that equals one if there is at least one son other than the eldest son and at least 
one of them adopts his wife’s surname), edsurname (a dummy variable that equals one if there 
is an eldest daughter and the eldest daughter married a man who adopted her surname), and 
odsurname (a dummy variable that equals one if there is at least one daughter other than the 
eldest daughter and at least one of them married a man who adopted her surname).
5  If 
individuals behave according to this variant of the dynasty model, we would expect essurname 
to reduce the probability of the parents living with the eldest son, ossurname to reduce the 
probability of the parents living with a child other than the eldest son, edsurname to increase the 
probability of the parents living with eldest daughter, and odsurname to increase the probability 
of the parents living with a child other than the eldest daughter.    Note that these findings might 
also be consistent with the selfish life cycle model since those with more noble surnames (who 
will tend to be relatively wealthy) will be more likely to want to perpetuate the family line and 
their daughters may be more willing to live with them and to marry a man who is willing to 
adopt her surname because of the greater financial rewards from doing so, but since we control 
  11  
 for parental wealth using parental occupation, educational attainment, income, and 
homeownership status, we believe that we can rule out the explanation based on the selfish life 
cycle model. 
 
(II)  The Selfish Life Cycle Model 
In order to examine whether individuals behave according to the selfish life cycle model, we 
include hexecutive (a dummy variable that equals one if the father (the mother if there is no 
father) was an executive before retirement (where executive includes management executive, 
executive board member, and management-level employee (including government workers)) 
(the base category is fathers (mothers if there is no father) who were rank-and-file salaried 
workers before retirement)), peduc (the average educational attainment (in years) of the parents 
(if there is only one parent, the educational attainment of that parent), pincome (the income of 
the father and mother combined),
6 and phouse (a dummy variable that equals one if the parents 
live in an owner-occupied home).  If the father was an executive before retirement, if the 
parents are highly educated, and/or if the combined income of the parents is high, the parents 
are presumably relatively wealthy and should have more wealth to leave behind to their children, 
and thus their children should be more likely to live with them if they are selfishly motivated.  
By the same token, the children of parents who are homeowners should also be more likely to 
live with their parents if they are selfishly motivated because they can expect to receive the 
family home as a bequest.  Thus, if the selfish life cycle model applies, we would expect 
hexecutive, peduc, pincome, and phouse to increase the probability of the parents living with 
their children.
7    Note, however, that these results could also be consistent with the (one-sided) 
altruism model if wealthier parents have larger and more luxurious homes and hence are better 
able to induce their children to live with them, even if they do not consciously attempt to coerce 
their children into living with them. 
 
(III) The Altruism Model 
We included variables relating to the educational attainment of the children as a way of testing 
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 the altruism model directly.  In particular, in sample (i), we included eeduc (the educational 
attainment of the eldest child (in years)) and keduc (the educational attainment of child(ren) 
other than the eldest child (if the number of such children is two, the average educational 
attainment of such children); in sample (iv), we included only eeduc as defined above; in 
sample (ii), we defined eeduc as the educational attainment of the eldest son (in years) and 
keduc as the educational attainment of child(ren) other than the eldest son (if the number of 
such children is two, the average educational attainment of such children); and in sample (iii), 
we defined eeduc as the educational attainment of the eldest daughter (in years) and keduc as 
the educational attainment of child(ren) other than the eldest daughter (if the number of such 
children is two, the average educational attainment of such children).  As Horioka (2002) 
points out, altruistic parents should leave larger bequests to poorer children, and since 
education is a good proxy for earning capacity, altruistic parents should leave larger bequests 
to less educated children.
8  Moreover, since the family home is often the largest component 
of parental wealth, it is plausible to assume that altruistic parents will choose to live with the 
least educated (poorest) child and bequeath the family home to him or her.  Thus, we would 
expect eeduc to reduce the probability of the parents living with the eldest child, son, or 
daughter and keduc to reduce the probability of the parents living with a child other than the 
eldest child, son, or daughter.  Note, however, that since the wage rate of less educated 
children is presumably lower than that of more highly educated children, meaning that they 
have a lower opportunity cost of providing care to their parents, the fact that they are more 
likely to live with (and to provide care to) their parents in old age could also be consistent with 
the selfish life cycle model. 
We also include a variable pertaining to parental attitudes towards their children to enable 
us to conduct a further test of the altruism model.  In the survey we use in our analysis, 
respondents were asked if they agree with a number of views concerning their attitudes 
towards their children, one of which is: “Parents should sacrifice themselves for their 
children.”    Respondents were asked to pick from among the following four choices.     
(1) I think so.     
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 (2) I tend to think so.   
(3) I tend not to think so.   
(4) I do not think so. 
We created the variable psacrifice (a dummy variable that equals one if parents think (or tend to 
think) that parents should sacrifice themselves for their children) and added it to equation (1).  
This variable is presumably a good proxy for parents who behave according to the altruism 
model because those who agree with this view are willing to put the interests of their children 
before their own.  However, since it is not obvious whether altruistic parents will be more or 
less likely to live with their children, it is not possible to predict a priori whether the marginal 
effect of psacrifice will be positive or negative. 
  Finally, another way to test the altruism model is to see if variables relating to the 
dynasty and selfish life cycle models (hselfempl, hprofl, essurname, ossurname, edsurname, 
odsurname,  hexecutive,  peduc, pincome,  hretired*pincome, and phouse) have the expected 
impact on the likelihood of parents living with their children.  If they do, this constitutes 
evidence unfavorable to the altruism model because the altruism model predicts that the 
behavior of parents and children will be motivated by altruism rather than by some sort of quid 
pro quo. 
 
(IV) Social Norms and Traditions       
One way in which we tested for the importance of social norms is by including elderson (a 
dummy variable that equals one if the eldest child is a son).    If the social norm is for parents to 
live with their eldest son regardless of whether the eldest son is the eldest child, the fact that the 
eldest child is a son should raise the probability that the parents live with their eldest child but 
whether the eldest son is the eldest child should not affect the probability that the parents live 
with their eldest son. 
Another way in which we tested for the importance of Japanese social norms and 
traditions was by using two variables created from the same question on parental attitudes 
towards their children that was discussed in section III above.    Two other views that are asked 
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 about are as follows: 
(a) Children should live with their parents when the parents become old and cannot take care 
of themselves.   
(b) It is an eldest son’s duty to take care of his parents.   
View (a) is consistent with the Japanese social norm or tradition (based on Confucian 
teachings) that children should live with their parents and take care of them when their parents 
become old, while view (b) is consistent with the Japanese social norm or tradition that more 
is expected of the eldest son.  Thus, we created the variables pchildduty and pesonduty 
(dummy variables that equal one if the respondent agrees (or tends to agree) with views (a) 
and (b), respectively), and added them to equation (1).  If individuals behave according to 
Japanese social norms and traditions, we would expect pchildduty to increase the probability 
of the parents living with the eldest son or with a child other than the eldest son and pesonduty 
to increase the probability of the parents living with the eldest son.
9 
  It is possible that parents tend to live with their eldest son not because of social norms 
but because the eldest son is likely to be the first to marry and purchase a house, meaning that 
parents will be able to coreside longer (and reap more benefits) if they coreside with their 
eldest son.  Similarly, parents may choose to live with their eldest son even if they have a 
daughter who is older than their eldest son not because of social norms but because Japanese 
women tend to marry older men to a greater extent than Western women, meaning that the 
issue of coresidence is likely to arise earlier in the case of their husband’s parents than in the 
case of their own parents.    This argument can explain why eldest sons are more likely to live 
with their parents (even if there is a daughter who is older than the eldest son) but does not 
explain why parental attitudes towards their children affect their probability of living with 
their children. 
 
(V) Control Variables 
Finally, we discuss the control variables we included.    First, we included the following 
variables relating to the parents: psingle (a dummy variable that equals one if there is only one 
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 parent), phealth (a dummy variable that equals one if one or both parents are unhealthy), page 
(the age of the parent if there is only one parent and the average age of the parents if there are 
two parents), hretired (a dummy variable that equals one if the father (the mother if there is no 
father) is currently retired), and hpartunempl (a dummy variable that equals one if the father 
(the mother if there is no father) was a part-time worker or unemployed before retirement. 
Next, we included four control variables relating to the composition of children: eson (a 
dummy variable that equals one if there is an eldest son), edaughter (a dummy variable that 
equals one if there is an eldest daughter), oson (a dummy variable that equals one if there is at 
least one son other than the eldest son), and odaughter (a dummy variable that equals one if 
there is at least one daughter other than the eldest daughter).
10  
In addition, we included the following variables relating to the marital status of the 
children: In sample (i), we included esingle (a dummy variable that equals one if the eldest 
child is single), edivorce (a dummy variable that equals one if the eldest child is divorced), 
ksingle (a dummy variable that equals one if at least one child other than the eldest child is 
single), and kdivorce (a dummy variable that equals one if at least one child other than the 
eldest child is single); in sample (iv), we included only esingle (a dummy variable that equals 
one if the only child is single) and edivorce (a dummy variable that equals one if the only child 
is divorced); in sample (ii), we defined esingle as a dummy variable that equals one if the 
eldest son is single, edivorce as a dummy variable that equals one if the eldest son is divorced, 
ksingle as a dummy variable that equals one if at least one child other than the eldest son is 
single, and kdivorced as a dummy variable that equals one if at least one child other than the 
eldest son is single; and in sample (iii), we defined esingle as a dummy variable that equals 
one if the eldest daughter is single, edivorce as a dummy variable that equals one if the eldest 
daughter is divorced, ksingle as a dummy variable that equals one if at least one child other 
than the eldest daughter is single, and kdivorced as a dummy variable that equals one if at least 
one child other than the eldest daughter is divorced; 
Finally, we included the following variables relating to the ages of the children: In  
sample (i), we included eage (the age of the eldest child) and kage (the average age of children 
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 other than the eldest child); in sample (iv), we included eage (the age of the only child); in 
sample (ii), we defined eage as the age of the eldest son and kage as the average age of 
children other than the eldest son; and in sample (iii), we defined eage as the age of the eldest 
daughter and kage as the average age of children other than the eldest daughter;   
 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
Before discussing the estimation results, we present some descriptive statistics to give the reader 
a general idea of the living arrangements of elderly parents and their children in Japan.  The 
upper row of Table 1 shows with which child elderly parents live, and as can be seen from this 
row, 53.4 percent of elderly parents with only one child live with their child, and about 20-40 
percent of elderly parents with two or more children live with their child or children.    Looking 
more specifically at with which child elderly parents live, an interesting pattern emerges: if 
elderly parents have an eldest son, they are much more likely to live with their eldest son than to 
live with children other than the eldest son (43.7 percent vs. 13.8 percent).  Second, the 
percentage of parents who live with their eldest child is only about 22.3 percent.  That is, 
parents are more likely to live with their eldest son even if the eldest son is not the eldest child.   
This is consistent with the Japanese social norm that the eldest son should live with,his parents 
and take care of them during old age.   
We look next at data on sons who adopt their wives’ surname and daughters whose 
husbands adopt their surname.    Such data shed light on the importance of the dynasty model 
because a son who adopts his wife’s surname cannot carry on his parents’ family line, and 
conversely, a daughter whose husband adopts her surname can carry on her parents’ family 
line.  If the dynasty model applies and parents care about perpetuating the family line, we 
would not expect parents with only one son and no daughters (hereafter referred to as “single 
sons”) to allow their sons to adopt their wives’ surname, and conversely, we would expect 
parents with only daughters to encourage at least one of their daughters to marry a man who is 
willing to adopt their surname. 
Looking at the results, only 3.2 percent of sons who are only children and 2.1 percent 
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 of eldest sons adopt their wives’ surnames whereas a full 12.9 percent of second-born sons and 
third-born sons do so, which indicates that sons who are only children and eldest sons are far 
less likely to adopt their wives’ surnames.  On the other hand, 7.2 percent of daughters who 
are only children, 14.6 percent of eldest daughters, and 13.3 percent of eldest daughters who 
have only sisters marry a man who adopts her surname, whereas only 1.7 percent of eldest 
daughters with brothers marry such a man.  Furthermore, 16.9 percent of daughters other 
than eldest daughters who have only sisters marry a man who adopts her surname, whereas 
only 0.9 percent of daughters other than eldest daughters with brothers marry such a man.  
Thus, households that have at least one son rarely have daughters who marry men who adopt 
their surnames (because if there is at least one son, the son can carry on the family line), 
whereas daughters with no brothers are much more likely to marry men who adopt their 
surnames in order to perpetuate the family line.    These results are consistent with the dynasty 
model because they underscore the eagerness of parents and their children to perpetuate the 
family line. 
 
6. Estimation Results 
In this section, we present our estimation results concerning the determinants of the living 
arrangements (coresidence behavior) of elderly parents and their children.  Table 2 shows the 
results for samples (i) and (iv), Table 3 the results for sample (ii), and Table 4 the results for 
sample (iii).    To conserve on space, we present only the marginal effects and standard errors of 
each coefficient.    We organize our discussion by theoretical model.   
First, we discuss our estimation results pertaining to the dynasty model.  Looking first 
at the marginal effects of hselfempl  and hprofl, our results show that the probability that 
parents live with their eldest son is 7.3 (18.7) percentage points higher if the husband was a 
non-professional (professional) self-employed worker before retirement than if he was a 
salaried worker before retirement.  Similarly, the probability that parents live independently 
is 7.1 (15.8) percentage points lower if the husband was a non-professional (professional) 
self-employed worker before retirement than if he was a salaried worker before retirement.   
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 These results are presumably due to the fact that self-employed households are different from 
salaried worker households in that the former have a family business that they would like to 
pass on their children, especially their eldest son, and the child who carries on the family 
business is more likely to live with his or her parents because he or she will inherit the family 
business (which is often located in, or adjacent to, the family home).  Thus, our result is 
consistent with the dynasty model.     
Turning to the marginal effects of the variables pertaining to whether or not sons adopt 
their wife’s surname and whether or not daughters marry a man who adopts their surname, the 
results show that the probability that parents live with their eldest son is 27.5 percentage points 
lower if their eldest son adopts his wife’s surname; that the probability that parents live with 
their eldest daughter is a full 46.6 percentage points higher, the probability that parents live 
with a child other than the eldest daughter is 11.3 percentage points lower, and the probability 
that parents live independently is 27.4 percentage points lower if their eldest daughter marries 
a man who adopts her surname; and that the probability that parents live with a child other 
than their eldest daughter is 12.0 percentage points higher if a daughter other than their eldest 
daughter marries a man who adopts her surname.  All of these results suggest that parents 
have a strong tendency to live with children who carry on their surname, which in turn 
suggests that the dynasty model is applicable in Japan. 
Next, we discuss our estimation results pertaining to the selfish life cycle model.  
Looking first at the marginal effect of hexecutive, our results show that the probability that 
parents live with a child other than the eldest son is 7.5 percentage points higher, the probability 
that parents live with the eldest daughter is 6.8 percentage points higher, and the probability that 
parents live independently is 8.6 percentage points lower if the father was an executive before 
retirement than if the father was a rank-and-file salaried worker before retirement.  The 
children of executives, who are presumably relatively wealthy, should be more likely to live 
with their parents if they are selfishly motivated and thus this finding is consistent with the 
selfish life cycle model (as well as with the altruism model, as discussed in section 2).   
Turning to the marginal effect of phouse, our results show that the probability that 
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 parents live with their eldest child is 10.4 percentage points higher, the probability that parents 
live with their eldest son is 17.6 percentage points higher, and the probability that parents live 
independently is 14.5 to 17.9 percentage points lower if they are homeowners than if they are 
renters.  The children of parents who are homeowners should be more likely to live with their 
parents if they are selfishly motivated because they can enhance their chances of receiving the 
family home as a bequest by living with the parents, and thus these results are consistent with 
the selfish life cycle model (as well as with the altruism model as discussed in section 2). 
Turning to the marginal effect of peduc, our results show that well-educated parents are, 
if anything, less likely to live with their eldest child, especially their eldest son, and more likely 
to live independently than less educated parents.  This result appears to be inconsistent with 
the selfish life cycle model because well-educated parents are presumably relatively wealthy 
and selfishly motivated children should be more likely to live with their parents if their parents 
are relatively wealthy.  This finding is also obtained by Iwamoto and Fukui (2001), and one 
possible explanation for it is that parents value their privacy and prefer to live separately from 
their children if they are relatively wealthy and can afford to do so. 
Turning to the marginal effects of pincome and hretired*pincome, the marginal effects of 
these variables are significant in only one case, indicating that parental income does not have a 
significant impact on the living arrangements of parents and children.  This result is also 
hostile to the selfish life cycle model because selfishly motivated children should be more likely 
to live their parents if their parents are relatively wealthy.   
Third, we discuss our estimation results pertaining to the altruism model.  Looking at 
the marginal effect of eeduc, our results show that parents are less likely to live with their eldest 
child or eldest son and more likely to live independently if their eldest child or eldest son is 
well-educated.  Moreover, the marginal effects of keduc show that parents are more likely to 
live with their eldest child and also more likely to live independently if their other children are 
well-educated.  These results are consistent with the altruism model because education is a 
good proxy for earnings capacity and altruistic parents should show a tendency to leave a larger 
bequest to (and live with) less educated (poorer) children than with better educated (wealthier)  
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 children but are also consistent with the selfish life cycle model, as noted in section 2.     
However, the marginal effect of psacrifice is not significant in any case except in the 
case of respondents with only one child, which constitutes evidence against the altruism model.   
Finally, the fact that the impact of a number of variables relating to the dynasty and selfish life 
cycle models were found to be significant and consistent with these models constitutes further 
evidence against the altruism model.    
Fourth, we discuss our estimation results pertaining to Japanese social norms and 
traditions.  Looking first at the marginal effects of variables pertaining to parental attitudes 
towards their children, the marginal effect of pchildduty imply that the probability that parents 
live independently is as much as 7.2 percentage points lower if they feel that children should 
live with their parents when the parents become old and cannot take care of themselves than if 
they do not hold this view.  Second, the marginal effect of pesonduty implies that the 
probability that parents live with the eldest son is 6.1 percentage points higher and the 
probability that parents live with children other than the eldest son is 4.3 percentage points 
lower if parents feel that it is an eldest son’s duty to take care of his parents than if they do not 
hold this view.  Both of these results suggest that Japanese social norms and traditions 
influence the coresidence decisions of Japanese parents.  
We next look at the marginal effect of elderson, which sheds further light on the 
importance of social norms.    If there is a social norm that parents should live with their eldest 
son, the probability that parents live with their eldest child should be significantly higher and 
the probability that parents live with children other than the eldest son and the probability that 
parents live independently should be significantly lower if the eldest child is a son, and the 
results using sample (i) confirm these results: the former probability is 24.3 percentage points 
higher and the second and third probabilities are 16.4 and 7.1 percentage points lower if the 
eldest child is a son.  Moreover, if there is a social norm that parents should live with their 
eldest son, they should live with the eldest son regardless of whether the eldest son is the 
eldest child, and thus elderson should not have a significant impact on the probability that 
parents live with their eldest son and this expectation is confirmed in the results using sample 
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 (ii).   
Finally, we discuss the impact of the control variables.  The  marginal effects  of  psingle 
show that the probability that parents live with their children is as much as 11.9 percentage 
points higher and that the probability that parents live independently is as much as 17.2 
percentage points lower for single-parent households than for two-parent households, which 
suggests that single parents are more likely to live with their children than two-parent 
households.  These are plausible results because, in two-parent households, the parents can take 
care of one other, whereas a single parent does not have this option and hence will be more 
likely to require the assistance of his/her children.     
  To summarize our findings in this section, the living arrangements (co-residence 
behavior) of elderly parents and their children in Japan are consistent in part with all four 
explanations considered (the dynasty model, the selfish life cycle model, the altruism model, 
and social norms and traditions) but most strongly support the life cycle and dynasty models 
(both of which assume selfishly motivated parents) and social norms and traditions and provide 
the least support for the altruism model. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we analyzed the determinants of the living arrangements (coresidence behavior) 
of elderly parents and their children (whether elderly parents live with their children, and if so, 
with which child) in Japan using micro data from the 1998 “National Family Survey (in 
Japanese, Kazoku ni tsuiteno Zenkoku Chousa),” which was conducted in January 1999 and 
provided by the National Family Research of Japan and the Information Center for Social 
Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo (SSJ Data 
Archive). 
Our results provide support for all four explanations of coresidence behavior but 
especially for the life cycle and dynasty models (both of which assume selfishly motivated 
parents) and social norms and traditions: The fact that parents who were self-employed before 
retirement are more likely to live with their children, the fact that parents are less likely to live 
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 with sons who adopt their wife’s surname, and the fact that parents are more likely to live with 
daughters whose husbands adopt their surname constitute evidence in favor of the dynasty 
model.  The fact that parents who were (relatively wealthy) executives before retirement and 
parents who are homeowners are more likely to live with their children and the fact that 
parents are more likely to live with less educated children constitute evidence in favor of the 
selfish life cycle model (or the altruism model).  And the fact that parental attitudes toward 
their children affect their coresidence behavior, the fact that parents are more likely to live 
with their eldest child if their eldest child is a son, and the fact that parents are most likely to 
live with their eldest son even if he is not the eldest child constitute evidence in favor of social 
norms and traditions.   
  Turning to a comparison of our results with those of previous studies, our results are 
consistent with the results of Ohtake (1991), Ohtake and Horioka (1994), Horioka, et al. 
(2000), Iwamoto and Fukui (2001), Yamada (2006), and Kureishi and Wakabayashi (2007) in 
that we find that the coresidence behavior of parents and children in Japan is in part selfishly 
motivated.
11  Moreover, our results are consistent with the results of Ando, et al. (1986) and 
Iwamoto and Fukui (2001) in that we find that the coresidence behavior of parents and 
children in Japan is partly motivated by a desire to perpetuate the family business.  Finally, 
our results are consistent with Martin and Tsuya (1991) and Tsuya and Martin (1992) in that 
we find that the coresidence behavior of parents and children is influenced by social norms.  
However, as far as we know, our study is the first to simultaneously test for the applicability of 
the four possible explanations of the coresidence behavior of parents and children in Japan, 
and this was made possible by our richer data set, which includes detailed information on 
siblings and parental attitudes towards their children.   
We turn finally to directions for further research.  The survey we use in our analysis 
collects information on family structure and sibling composition, making it ideal for the 
purposes of the analysis here, but information on many socioeconomic characteristics (for 
example, the financial assets of parents and children, the income of each child, transfers from 
parents to each child and vice versa, etc.) is not available.    One direction for further research 
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 is to find a data source that includes information on these variables so that we can do a more 
rigorous analysis, especially of the selfish life cycle model.   
Another shortcoming of our analysis is that we used attitudinal data without taking 
account of the possibility that respondents may try to justify their own behavior when 
responding to attitudinal questions.  Finding a way to eliminate the bias caused by this 
problem is another possible avenue for further research.   
Turning finally to the policy implications of our findings, our finding that the living 
arrangements (coresidence behavior) of elderly parents and their children is in part selfishly 
motivated suggests that the selfish life cycle model applies in Japan to at least some extent, 
and this, in turn, implies that the aging of the population will cause Japan’s household saving 
rate to decline because elderly parents will not need to save in order to leave unrequited 
bequests to their children.  Moreover, this, in turn, may cause interest rates in Japan to rise 
unless the decline in household saving is fully offset by increases in corporate and/or 
government saving and/or increases in capital inflows from abroad. 
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 Sample (i) Sample (ii) Sample (iii) Sample (iv)
Parents with two or
more children (1373
observations)
Parents with two or
more children and
with at least one son
(1125 observations)
Parents with two or
more children and







     with eldest child/son/daughter/child 295 (21.49) 492 (43.73) 239 (22.55) 149 (53.41)
     with other children 368 (26.80) 155 (13.78) 254 (23.96) -
     with both 143 (10.42) 28 (2.49) 132 (12.45) -
     independently 567 (41.30) 450 (40.00) 435 (41.04) 130 (46.59)
Father's occupation
     hexecutive  159 (11.58)  129 (11.47) 122 (11.51) 36 (12.90)
     hprofl  26 (1.89) 20 (1.78) 20 (1.89)  4 (1.43)
     hselfempl  317 (23.09)  264 (23.47) 243 (22.92)  38 (13.62)
     hsalaried  674 (49.09)  550 (48.89)  520 (49.06)  163 (58.42)
     hpartunemp 197 (14.35) 162 (14.40) 155 (14.62) 38 (13.62)
hretired 843 (51.03)  555 (49.33)   520 (49.06) 157 (56.27)
essurname 16 (1.17) 24 (2.13) -  9 (3.23)
edsurname  41 (2.99) - 47 (4.43) 20 (7.17)
ossurname 45 (3.28) 145 (12.89) 30 (2.83) -
odsurname  24 (1.75) 38 (3.38)  49 (4.62) -
peduc* 11.20 (1.96) 11.18 (1.97)  11.20 (1.97) 11.47 (1.90)
pincome* (million yen)  4.82 (3.98)  4.81 (4.05) 4.85 (4.03) 4.33 (3.79)
phouse 1,221 (88.93)  1,003 (89.16) 947 (89.34) 229 (82.08) 
eeduc* (years) 13.72 (1.96) 13.98 (2.12) 13.34 (1.67) 13.76 (2.08)
oeduc* (years) 13.59 (1.84)  13.60 (1.87) 13.77 (1.91) -
Parents attitude towards their children
     psacrifice 866 (63.07) 717 (63.73) 666 (62.83)  171 (61.29)
     pchildduty 870 (63.36)  731 (64.98)  667 (62.92) 182 (65.23)
     pesonduty 618 (45.01)  542 (48.18) 479 (45.19)  113 (40.50)
psingle 275 (20.03) 232 (20.62) 215 (20.28) 88 (31.54)
phealth  713 (51.93) 597 (53.07) 561 (52.92) 143 (51.25)
Children's marriage condition
     esingle 292 (21.27) 338 (30.04) 202 (19.06) 105 (37.63)
     emarriage 1,031 (75.09)  760 (67.56)   815 (76.89) 165 (59.14)
     edivorce 50 (3.64) 27 (2.40)  43 (4.06)  9 (3.23)
     osingle  499 (36.34)  341 (30.31) 391 (36.89) -
     omarriage 964 (70.21)  850 (75.56)  756 (71.32) -
     odivorce 50 (3.64) 53 (4.71) 38 (3.58) -
page* (years old) 64.72 (6.75) 64.75 (6.77) 64.69 (6.69) 64.11 (8.36)
eage* (years old) 39.30 (7.46) 37.97 (7.78)  37.90 (7.75) 36.42 (9.70)
kage* (years old) 35.41 (7.54)   36.60 (7.63) 36.51 (7.61) -
elderson 714 (52.00) 714 (63.47) 401 (37.83) 150 (53.76)
Notes: Refer to the main text for variable definitions.  The first figure indicates the number of observations and the second figure (in
parentheses) denotes the share of the total sample (except where otherwise noted).  hsalaried is a dummy variable that equals one if the
husband was a rank-and-file salaried worker before retirement.
*The first figure denotes the mean and the second figure (in parentheses) denotes the standard deviation.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Data source: The 1998 "National Family Survey (in Japanese, Kazoku ni tsuiteno Zenkoku Chousa)," conducted by National Family
Research of Japan
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 0.027 0.012 0.027 -0.065 ** 0.157
(0.027) (0.030) (0.445) (0.032) (0.103)
0.126 0.023 -0.048 -0.101 0.159
(0.082) (0.081) (0.044) (0.079) (0.229)
-0.102 -0.009 -0.105 *** 0.216 * -
(0.082) (0.112) (0.006) (0.125) -
0.411 *** -0.160 *** 0.061 -0.312 *** 0.458 ***
(0.068) (0.045) (0.056) (0.046) (0.050)
0.138 ** 0.061 0.006 -0.206 *** -
(0.060) (0.084) (0.072) (0.064) -
-0.218 *** 0.237 ** 0.281 *** -0.300 *** -
(0.009) (0.103) (0.094) (0.058) -
0.004 0.045 0.008 -0.057 0.111
(0.036) (0.039) (0.023) (0.040) (0.108)
-0.018 *** -0.001 0.000 0.018 ** -0.015
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.023)
0.104 *** 0.048 0.026 -0.178 *** 0.143
(0.028) (0.033) (0.017) (0.039) (0.100)
-0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.013)
-0.007 0.002 0.009 ** -0.004 0.022
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.025)
-0.016 *** -0.003 0.002 0.017 ** -0.033
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.021)
0.014 ** -0.008 -0.020 *** 0.014 * -
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) -
-0.007 0.036 0.003 -0.032 0.128 *
(0.021) (0.023) (0.014) (0.025) (0.075)
0.035 0.022 0.015 -0.072 *** 0.121
(0.023) (0.024) (0.015) (0.027) (0.083)
0.016 -0.019 0.003 0.000 -0.076
(0.022) (0.025) (0.015) (0.027) (0.080)
0.243 *** -0.164 *** -0.007 -0.071 ** -
(0.027) (0.029) (0.018) (0.033) -
0.036 0.119 *** -0.001 -0.154 *** 0.126
(0.028) (0.033) (0.018) (0.033) (0.090)
-0.069 0.114 ** 0.015 -0.060 0.064
(0.053) (0.033) (0.024) (0.052) (0.079)
-0.003 0.059 0.046 ** -0.101 ** -
(0.031) (0.036) (0.018) (0.044) -
0.032 0.008 0.028 -0.068 * -
(0.033) (0.036) (0.021) (0.041) -
0.073 * -0.021 0.008 -0.059 -




Data source:  The same as Table 1.
Notes: The figures represent marginal effects evaluated at the sample mean and their standard errors.
hprofl
Sample (iv) (279 obs.)
Parents live with their
only child (=1) or live
independently (=0)
* denotes significant at the 10% level, ** denotes significant at the 5% level, and *** denotes significant at the 1% level.  
The results for sample (i) were estimated using a multinomial logit model, while the results for sample (iv) were estimated
using a logit model.
We used the STATA command margeff8, which analytically estimates marginal effects and standard errors for marginal
effects using the delta method.
phealth, hretired, hpartunemp, page, eage, kage, esingle, edivorce, ksingle, kdivorce, and a constant term were included in
















Table 2: Estimation Results for Samples (i) and (iv) (Marginal Effects)
Dependent variable
Sample (i) (1373 observations)
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 0.073 * 0.013 -0.014 -0.071 **
(0.038) (0.026) (0.010) (0.036)
0.187 * -0.004 -0.026 *** -0.158 **
(0.098) (0.073) (0.004) (0.077)
-0.275 *** 0.042 0.023 0.209 **
(0.090) (0.073) (0.041) (0.094)
-0.045 0.021 0.104 * -0.080
(0.131) (0.099) (0.063) (0.144)
0.062 0.030 0.021 *** -0.113 **
(0.055) (0.037) (0.005) (0.055)
0.404 *** 0.027 -0.026 *** -0.406 ***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.004) (0.013)
0.013 0.075 ** -0.002 -0.086 **
(0.050) (0.036) (0.014) (0.042)
-0.023 *** -0.002 -0.001 0.025 ***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008)
0.176 *** -0.034 0.003 -0.145 ***
(0.040) (0.031) (0.014) (0.044)
-0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
0.008 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)
-0.037 *** 0.003 0.004 0.030 ***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009)
0.001 0.004 -0.001 -0.004
(0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.010)
0.007 0.028 -0.006 -0.030
(0.029) (0.019) (0.010) (0.028)
0.040 0.029 0.001 -0.070 **
(0.032) (0.020) (0.010) (0.031)
0.061 * -0.043 ** -0.016 -0.003
(0.031) (0.021) (0.010) (0.030)
0.075 0.053 -0.078 -0.050
(0.055) (0.035) (0.076) (0.060)
0.114 *** 0.065 ** -0.006 -0.172 ***
(0.039) (0.028) (0.012) (0.036)
0.011 0.025 -0.002 -0.034
(0.067) (0.030) (0.083) (0.065)
0.038 -0.001 -0.013 -0.024
(0.058) (0.033) (0.011) (0.058)
0.014 0.033 -0.014 -0.032
(0.048) (0.038) (0.010) (0.043)
Data source: The same as Table 1.










Sample (ii) (1125 observations)
(ix)
Parents live with
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 -0.001 0.016 0.011 -0.026
(0.025) (0.031) (0.020) (0.036)
-0.179 *** 0.087 0.175 *** -0.083
(0.044) (0.079) (0.047) (0.083)
-0.064 -0.015 -0.080 * 0.159
(0.063) (0.101) (0.044) (0.108)
0.466 *** -0.113 ** -0.079 * -0.274 ***
(0.067) (0.044) (0.041) (0.052)
0.011 0.056 0.148 ** -0.215 **
(0.111) (0.115) (0.048) (0.101)
0.029 0.120 ** -0.047 -0.101
(0.045) (0.058) (0.065) (0.063)
0.068 * -0.024 -0.016 -0.028
(0.035) (0.042) (0.031) (0.047)
0.000 0.000 -0.012 ** 0.012
(0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008)
0.040 0.076 ** 0.063 *** -0.179 ***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.024) (0.043)
0.003 0.002 -0.005 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
-0.002 0.002 0.007 -0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
-0.006 0.002 -0.001 0.006
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
-0.004 -0.019 *** -0.010 ** 0.034 ***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
0.011 0.017 -0.017 -0.011
(0.020) (0.024) (0.017) (0.028)
0.031 -0.010 0.010 -0.031
(0.020) (0.026) (0.019) (0.030)
-0.028 0.035 0.020 -0.027
(0.021) (0.026) (0.019) (0.030)
-0.013 -0.307 *** 0.399 *** -0.079
(0.032) (0.028) (0.045) (0.049)
0.029 0.074 ** 0.069 *** -0.172 ***
(0.027) (0.033) (0.024) (0.037)
-0.080 ** 0.132 *** 0.012 -0.065
(0.033) (0.031) (0.018) (0.052)
-0.010 0.103 ** -0.012 -0.082 *
(0.027) (0.042) (0.018) (0.043)
-0.048 0.047 0.030 -0.029
(0.031) (0.033) (0.030) (0.042)
Data source: The same as Table 1.
Notes: The same as Table 2.
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 Endnotes 
                                                      
1 By contrast, Ando, et al. (1986) and Hayashi (1997) find that parental assets lower the probability 
of coresidence.  The conflicting results are presumably due to the presence of two conflicting 
effects:  To the extent that parents value their privacy, they will want to live apart from their 
children if they can afford to do so, and thus parental wealth will have a negative impact on the 
probability of coresidence.    By contrast, to the extent that greater parental wealth will induce their 
children to live with them, parental wealth will have a positive impact on the probability of 
coresidence.   The net effect of parental wealth will thus depend on the relative strengths of these 
two effects. 
2 There are some studies for countries other than Japan that analyze living arrangements and 
caregiving in the case of multiple children (e.g., Hoerger, et al. (1996), Hiedmann and Stern (1999), 
Checkovich and Stern (2002), Engers and Stern (2002), and Konrad, et al. (2002)).    For example, 
Konrad, et al. (2002) analyze the residential location decisions of children in Germany and find 
evidence that German children are altruistic toward their parents but that the first-born child 
exploits his or her first-mover advantage by locating far from his or her parents in order to shift the 
burden of caring for them to his or her younger siblings. 
3 It is true that dropping respondents with four or more children will lead to sample selection bias, 
especially since those with four or more children are likely to belong to an earlier cohort and have 
more traditional values, as pointed out by an anonymous referee, but we do not believe that this 
bias will be all that serious because we control for the age of parents and because those with four 
or more children compromise only 5.3 percent of the total sample. 
4 We use the mfx88 command in STATA to calculate the marginal effect of multinomial logit 
models.   
5 We did not include ossurname or odsurname in the sample of respondents with only one child for 
obvious reasons and we did not include essurname in this sample either because there was only 
one observation for which the value of this variable was one, meaning that its coefficient could not 
be estimated. 
6 The incomes of the working elderly and the retired elderly will not be directly comparable 
because the incomes of the working elderly will be higher as a ratio of their lifetime incomes than 
the incomes of the retired elderly.  In order to control for this, we included the cross-product of 
hretired (a variable that equals one if the father (the mother if there is no father) is retired) and 
pincome in addition to pincome. 
7 Note, however, that hexecutive, peduc, and pincome are all proxies for parental income, which is 
not necessarily a bequeathable asset.  By contrast, phouse does not suffer from this drawback 
because housing is almost always bequeathed to one’s children in Japan.   
8 However, as Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman (1982) have shown, it is theoretically possible that   1  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
parental preferences will be such that transfers to their children will be reinforcing rather than 
compensating. 
9 Because of the possibility that there is multicollinearity among the proportions of respondents 
adhering to the three views, we checked for this possibility and obtained the following results: the 
correlation between the probability of respondents adhering to views (a) and (b) is 0.195, that 
between the probability of respondents adhering to views (a) and (c) is 0.266, and that between the 
probability of respondents adhering to views (b) and (c) is 0.384.  Thus, the correlation between 
the proportions of respondents adhering to views (b) and (c) is the highest, but even this correlation 
is not overwhelmingly high.         
10 We did not include eson in the sample of respondents with multiple children including at least 
one son or edaughter in the sample of respondents with multiple children including at least one 
daughter because they equal one for all observations in these samples.  Moreover, we included 
only eson in the sample of respondents with only one child. 
11 Dekle (1990) reaches the same conclusion (that the Japanese are selfish) by showing that the 
number of living children does not have a significant impact on the saving behavior of the elderly 
in Japan, which suggests that they do not have a bequest motive. 